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INTRODUCTION 
When, exactly, does invention occur? That is the question at the heart of 
Mark Lemley’s perceptive article, Ready for Patenting.1 Patent law, Lemley 
shows, usually treats invention as occurring before the inventor has built a 
prototype or tested the new idea, systematically favoring those who quickly 
file a patent application over those who do the messy work of actual 
implementation.2 Lemley argues that the legal incentives for early filing cause 
significant harm, including, most relevant to this Symposium on notice failure, 
that patents issued from early-filed applications tend to be overly broad 
because the applicant does not yet know how the claimed invention works.3 
Lemley offers several recommendations to help solve this problem of 
overclaiming. To begin with, he would reduce incentives for early filing by 
ensuring that experimental uses or noncommercial sales of an invention (such 
as sales to beta testers) do not defeat the inventor’s right to a patent so long as 
the inventor is diligently trying to perfect the invention.4 He would also 
constrain patent scope directly by, for example, restricting patentees’ ability to 
engage in functional claiming, a practice that essentially allows a patentee to 
claim to own any technology that solves a particular problem, rather than 
limiting the patentee to the particular solution he or she devised.5 
Lemley makes a persuasive argument that patent law should, in general, 
offer more protection to patentees who build their inventions than it offers to 
 
* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. For comments and helpful 
discussions, thanks to Jack Beermann, Kevin Collins, Chris Cotropia, Mark Lemley, Mike 
Meurer, Rachel Rebouché, and Michael Risch. Thanks also to Ben Greene for superb 
research assistance. 
1 Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171 (2016). 
2 Id. at 1172-73. 
3 Id. at 1173. 
4 Id. at 1194-95. 
5 Id. at 1192. For a comprehensive critique of functional claiming in modern patent law, 
see Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. 
REV. 905, 908. 
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the mere “paper patentees” who never practice their inventions.6 But, as I 
explain in the first part of this essay, protecting builders is not without cost. 
One of the primary legal incentives for early filing is the rule that, when 
several persons seek to patent an identical invention, the first person who filed 
a patent application gets the patent.7 That priority rule can dissuade inventors 
from building their inventions (at least until they file a patent application), but 
it has the benefit of providing a clear, bright-line test. Similarly, although the 
experimental use doctrine (which protects experimental uses of an invention 
from defeating a patent’s claim to novelty) can encourage inventors to perfect 
their invention before seeking a patent, applying that doctrine raises hard 
questions about whether a prior use of an invention was genuinely 
experimental. To be sure, the social costs of overbroad and underdeveloped 
patents that result from the early-filing incentives embedded in current law 
may outweigh the costs of the occasional fights over priority and novelty that 
would occur under the regime Lemley prefers. But his argument against early 
filing would be even stronger if it engaged the tradeoff between clear rules and 
fuzzy standards. 
Lemley’s critique of functional claiming as a source of overly broad patent 
protection is also persuasive, and it has already found traction in the courts. In 
June 2015, the Federal Circuit issued an en banc decision, Williamson v. Citrix 
Online, LLC,8 that made the relevant law of claim construction more standard-
like and less rule-like, offering courts newfound discretion to constrain the 
scope of patents drafted in functional terms.9 Building on Lemley’s critique of 
functional claiming, the second part of this essay considers the consequences 
of Williamson by looking at early district court decisions applying it. Those 
decisions confirm that Williamson provides a ground to narrow or even to 
invalidate the broadest functional patent claims. But the decisions also show 
how the new, standard-like law of claim construction offers courts ample 
discretion to maintain the status quo, if they so choose. Moreover, the early 
decisions applying Williamson provide a roadmap for future patent applicants 
to draft around the Federal Circuit’s opinion and obtain broad, functionally 
defined claims.  Accordingly, doctrines outside the sphere of claim 
construction, such as the requirement of patentable subject matter under § 101 
 
6 On paper patentees, see generally John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1360 (2013). 
7 Before the America Invents Act took effect in March 2013, the first person to file 
usually received the patent, although the rules governing priority were relatively complex. 
See Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really 
Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1300 (2003) (finding that the last person to file actually 
obtained priority in roughly forty percent of disputed cases). Under the simpler priority 
regime of the America Invents Act, the first person to file will practically always receive the 
patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
8 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
9 Id. at 1349-51. 
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of the Patent Act, will continue to be important to combating notice failure in 
patent law. 
I.  EARLY FILING: INCENTIVES, COSTS, AND BENEFITS 
Does invention occur upon the mental act of conceiving a new idea? Or does 
invention occur only when the inventor builds a working embodiment of that 
idea—what, in patent parlance, would be called an “actual reduction to 
practice”? Our current patent law treats invention as something closer to 
conception than actual reduction to practice. Under the Patent Act of 1952 
(which governs all patents whose applications were filed before March 16, 
2013), priority generally goes to the first inventor to reduce an invention to 
practice without abandoning it.10 Critically, however, the filing of a patent 
application counts as a “constructive” reduction to practice that secures an 
inventor’s priority.11 Thus, as Lemley observes, “[a]n inventor is better off 
filing a patent application as early as possible, before—or perhaps instead of—
building a prototype or testing the invention.”12 The America Invents Act 
(which governs all patents with applications filed on or after March 16, 2013) 
creates an even stronger incentive for early filing by giving priority to the first 
inventor to file a patent application, regardless of who was the first to conceive 
the invention or to actually reduce it to practice.13 
Lemley questions these strong incentives for early filing. He relies mainly 
on the work of Chris Cotropia, who has catalogued several problems with early 
filing, including: (1) it results in more patent applications, which adds to the 
backlog at the patent office and reduces the quality of examination; (2) it leads 
to a greater number of issued patents, many of which will go undeveloped 
because of the early stage at which they were obtained; and, most pertinent to 
this Symposium, (3) it causes patents to have unclear boundaries because, at 
the time of filing, the inventor does not know and therefore cannot describe 
how the invention actually works.14 As Lemley elaborates, patents based on 
 
10 See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 426-27 (6th ed. 2013) (summarizing priority rules). 
11 Id. The notion that the 1952 Act treats invention as something closer to conception 
than reduction to practice is further illustrated by an exception to the rule that grants priority 
to the first inventor to reduce to practice: even if an inventor was the last to reduce the 
invention to practice, that inventor retains priority if he or she was the first to conceive the 
invention and was diligent in reducing it to practice. See Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 
624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
12 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1179. 
13 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
14 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1187-88 (quoting Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early 
Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 70 (2009)). 
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guesses about how an invention might work are likely to be broader in scope 
than patents based on working models.15 
Of course, a patent that does not adequately disclose how to make or use the 
invention is invalid due to the Patent Act’s enablement requirement.16 Lemley 
argues, however, that the courts have been too lax in enforcing that 
requirement, citing cases in which the Federal Circuit has ruled that a patent 
can be enabled by mere “prophetic examples”—basically, educated 
speculations about how one might make the invention—as well as cases that 
allow an inventor to establish priority even if the inventor was unsure whether 
the invention would work.17 Although that case law appears troubling, it is 
hard to tell if it reflects a systemic problem of overclaiming by patent 
applicants. An accused infringer trying to show lack of enablement during 
litigation must do so by clear and convincing evidence—a higher evidentiary 
burden than applies during examination—which could explain why Federal 
Circuit decisions on enablement appear very friendly to patent holders.18 
Still, the argument that early-filed patents tend to be broad in scope makes 
sense intuitively (although some might contend that broad, early-issued patents 
are necessary to ensure further development of the claimed technology).19 
Thus, rather than incentivizing early filing, Lemley argues, patent law should 
reward those who take the time to ensure that their invention works. One way 
to do that would be to eliminate paper patents and require actual reduction to 
practice before the patent office is allowed to issue a patent.20 But Lemley 
 
15 Id. Another reason an early-filed patent might be broader than a later-filed patent is 
that an early patent applicant has less prior art to avoid and hence less reason to narrow the 
claims in the application. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 320 (2003).  
16 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (requiring the patent’s specification to “contain a written 
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such 
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same”). 
17 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1179 (citing Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 
F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 
F.2d 1569, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
18 Indeed, the high standard of proof seemed to play a role in the Atlas Powder decision. 
See 750 F.2d at 1577 (“Use of prophetic examples . . . does not automatically make a patent 
non-enabling. The burden is on one challenging validity to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the prophetic examples together with other parts of the specification are not 
enabling. Du Pont did not meet that burden here.”).  
19 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 268-69 (1977).  
20 For a recommendation along those lines, see Cotropia, supra note 14, at 120. See also 
Duffy, supra note 6, at 1360 (arguing for the revival of a doctrine under which “[m]ere 
paper patents . . . were construed narrowly and were more likely to be held invalid” but 
“patents successfully commercialized . . . were favored in determining patent scope and 
validity”). 
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rejects the idea of eliminating paper patents, in part because it is unrealistic.21 
The clear trend in the law is to favor early filing, as illustrated by the recent 
statutory switch to a first-to-file priority rule. Lemley therefore focuses on a 
more modest goal, arguing that the law should, at minimum, not treat patent 
applicants less favorably because they tried to build and test their invention.22 
At first glance, it is hard to disagree with that argument. The core purpose of 
patent law is utilitarian: it enhances social welfare by incentivizing the 
development of new and useful technology.23 An invention that has been built 
and tested and that works seems more likely to increase social welfare than an 
invention that exists only on paper. That said, even if a working model exists, a 
good patent attorney will add claims that broaden the patent’s scope as far as 
the patent office will allow, so disputes over patent breadth are unlikely to 
disappear even if the law were to discourage early filing. 
More to the point, figuring out the optimal timing of patent issuance—
should the patent issue upon conception? reduction to practice? sometime in 
between?—is an extraordinarily complex endeavor. On one hand, we want 
innovative technology to be shared with society as soon as possible, which 
helps explain patent law’s emphasis on early filing.24 On the other hand, we 
also want the invention disclosed in a patent—and the exclusive rights given to 
the inventor—to be tailored to the inventor’s novel and nonobvious 
contribution, suggesting, as Lemley argues, that we ought not discourage 
inventors from building their inventions before filing their patent application. 
Lemley makes a strong case that, whatever the optimal timing of patent 
issuance, the law currently places too much emphasis on early disclosure. But 
Lemley’s case is not lock-tight, for there remain good reasons to simply grant a 
patent to the inventor who wins the race to the patent office. This essay is, to 
be sure, not the space to fully consider the many possible justifications for 
early filing, but two common justifications are particularly relevant to 
Lemley’s article. 
First, as Lemley observes, the earlier a patent is granted, the earlier the 
patent will expire and the invention will enter the public domain.25 Lemley 
concedes that earlier patent expiration is a social benefit that flows from early 
filing, and he acknowledges that that benefit undercuts his case against early 
filing.26 But I am not sure Lemley should be so quick to make that concession, 
for earlier patent expiration might not matter much in the computer-related 
 
21 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1187-90. 
22 Id. at 1191. 
23 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1031, 1031 (2005). 
24 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 878-79 (1990). 
25 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1186 (citing John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory 
of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 440 (2004)). 
26 Id. 
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fields where concerns about overly broad patents are most salient today.27 
Given the rapid pace of technological change in computer hardware and 
software, the patent term (currently twenty years from the date the application 
is filed28) is already longer than the useful life of most inventions.29 Whether a 
patented software program passes into the public domain twenty years from 
today or twenty-one years from today—as might occur if we encouraged the 
inventor to more fully develop the invention before obtaining a patent—seems, 
at least on first blush, to be inconsequential. 
Of course, one could cite several infamous examples of broad patents relied 
upon to assert infringement by technology developed long after the inventor 
filed the patent application. The late Jerome Lemelson, for instance, filed 
patent applications on barcode technology in the 1950s, but, because of his 
strategic use of continuations at the patent office, he was able to assert the 
patents against technology developed in the 1990s.30 Similarly, in the 1980s, 
an inventor named Charles Freeny conceived of a kiosk for producing music 
tapes in retail stores using digital information.31 The patent Freeny obtained, 
however, contained claims that were sufficiently abstract to allow a company 
called E-Data to assert the patent years later against firms engaged in the quite 
different field of Internet commerce.32 Similar instances of overclaiming have 
occurred in biotechnology, where holders of patents covering early-stage 
research (such as gene fragments) have asserted their patents against later-
developed practical applications of that research (such as diagnostic tests or 
therapeutic uses).33 Likewise, in the pharmaceutical industry, sellers of brand 
name drugs sometimes obtain weak follow-on patents, such as patents on 
slightly different formulations, that do little more than extend market 
exclusivity.34 
All of these examples are consistent with Lemley’s concession that earlier 
patent expiration increases social welfare. Recent changes in the law, however, 
make similar examples of overclaiming less likely to occur in the future. These 
changes at least partly undermine the argument that early patent expiration 
 
27 On the vagueness and overbreadth problems with software patents, see JAMES BESSEN 
& MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT 
INNOVATORS AT RISK 200 (2008). 
28 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). 
29 See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software 
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 46 (2001). 
30 See Karen E. Sandrik, Warranting Rightful Claims, 72 LA. L. REV. 873, 886-87 
(2012). The Federal Circuit ultimately held Lemelson’s patents to be unenforceable under 
the doctrine of prosecution laches. Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & 
Research Found., LP, 422 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
31 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 27, at 8. 
32 See id. at 67. 
33 Id. 
34 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1687 n.418 (2003). 
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justifies early filing. For example, Lemelson-style “submarine” patents are 
now harder to obtain because the patent term is tied to the date the application 
is filed rather than the date of issuance35 and because publication of patent 
applications is usually required.36 Likewise, as discussed in more detail below, 
recent Supreme Court decisions on patentable subject matter have limited the 
patentability of broad claims on basic research that can be used to assert 
infringement by later-developed applications of that research.37 
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that earlier patent expiration should be 
irrelevant as a policy goal. Rather, my point is that Lemley might qualify his 
concession that earlier patent expiration justifies early filing. In some 
circumstances, that is probably true. But in other circumstances, earlier patent 
expiration probably does not matter very much because, by the time the patent 
expires, the claimed technology is obsolete. Obsolescence before patent 
expiration is particularly likely with computer software, the field in which, 
again, the problem of overly broad patents is most severe. 
A second justification for encouraging early filing—and one that Lemley’s 
article discusses only briefly38—is that early filing lends itself to clear rules of 
priority and novelty. A first-to-file priority rule, although it incentivizes early 
filing, saves the patent office and the courts from conducting context-specific 
inquiries to determine whether an invention is patentable and, if so, who gets 
the patent. For instance, under pre-America Invents Act law, the person who 
was the first to conceive an invention but the last to reduce it to practice could 
still claim priority if that person was diligent in reducing the invention to 
practice.39 Determining, based on all the circumstances, whether someone was 
diligent in reducing an invention to practice is much more difficult than 
determining who filed a patent application first. Interference proceedings to 
determine priority could last a decade or more40 and cost the parties hundreds 
of thousands of dollars.41 A first-to-file rule, though it encourages early filing, 
eliminates most disputes over priority.42 
 
35 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). 
36 See id. § 122(b) (providing that applications will be published eighteen months after 
filing unless the applicant certifies that the invention will not be the subject of an application 
filed in another country that requires publication of applications). 
37 See infra Part II; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013) (holding that isolated gene sequences are not patent eligible). 
38 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1195 n.123. 
39 See, e.g., Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
40 See, e.g., Brown v. Barbacid, 436 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
41 See Charles R.B. Macedo, Note, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the 
International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 543, 
570 n.138. 
42 Although the America Invents Act eliminated interferences, it created a derivation 
proceeding, which allows an inventor to file a petition claiming that a person who filed an 
earlier application actually derived the invention from the petitioner and that, therefore, the 
petitioner should receive the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2012). The issues the patent office 
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Lemley also supports a robust experimental use doctrine as a way to ensure 
that those who actually build their inventions can still satisfy patent law’s 
novelty requirement. But assessing whether a prior use was truly experimental, 
like assessing one’s diligence in reducing an invention to practice, requires a 
fact-intensive and potentially costly inquiry. Some background: The Patent Act 
of 1952 (which, recall, governs all patents with applications filed before March 
16, 2013) requires an inventor to file a patent application within one year of 
engaging in a public use or a sale of the invention or else the invention is 
deemed to have been anticipated and therefore is not patentable.43 Under the 
1952 Act, the one-year clock does not begin running if the inventor can show 
that the public use or sale was part of an experiment to perfect the invention.44 
Although this experimental use doctrine protects inventors who actually build 
their inventions, the doctrine is not easy to apply. In a leading case, the Federal 
Circuit canvassed its case law and collected thirteen factors that it deemed 
relevant to determining whether or not a public use or a sale was 
experimental.45 
As Lemley notes, there is some debate about whether the experimental use 
doctrine survives the America Invents Act.46 If, in fact, the doctrine has been 
abolished, inventors will be further incentivized to file early because any 
disclosure of the invention will start the running of the one-year grace period. 
Although abolition of the experimental use doctrine would, like a first-to-file 
priority rule, punish builders and incentivize early filing, it would help avoid 
fights over novelty, just as a first-to-file rule helps avoid fights over priority. 
The benefits of bright-line rules of novelty and priority are, to be sure, 
difficult to quantify. And, although I have focused on the economic costs of 
fuzzy standards in this area of law, litigation under those fuzzy standards might 
sometimes produce valuable information about how the invention works, 
 
may consider during a derivation proceeding are limited in scope, however. See Courtenay 
C. Brinckerhoff, The Limited Scope of the New Derivation Proceedings, PHARMAPATENTS 
(Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/2012/10/16/the-limited-scope-of-the-
new-derivation-proceedings [https://perma.cc/A6H3-D8MJ]. And, to date, few derivation 
proceedings have been instituted. See Michael J. Bruner et al., First PTAB Decisions in 
Derivation Proceedings, JONES DAY (Dec. 2014), http://www.jonesday.com/first-ptab-
decisions-in-derivation-proceedings-12-05-2014 [https://perma.cc/YHG4-8CD2]. 
43 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006), repealed by America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,       
§ 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 285-86 (2011). A similar rule applies under the America Invents Act 
in the form of a one-year grace period granted to an inventor who discloses the invention. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
44 See City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877). 
45 Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
46 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1183-85; see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2133.03(e) (9th ed. 2015) (stating that the 
experimental use doctrine is “not applicable to applications subject to examination under the 
first inventor to file . . . provisions of the [America Invents Act]”). 
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getting the invention closer to commercialization.47 More fundamentally, the 
costs of occasional but complex disputes over novelty and priority may be 
outweighed by the social costs of overbroad and underdeveloped patents that 
result from early-filing incentives. But Lemley’s argument in favor of 
protecting inventors who build and test their inventions would be even stronger 
if it contained a more extensive discussion of the tradeoff between rules and 
standards in this area. 
In sum, Lemley tells a persuasive story about how legal incentives for early 
filing are contributing to a proliferation of overly broad patents. To solve that 
problem, Lemley recommends, among other things, strengthening patent law’s 
disclosure doctrines, particularly the enablement requirement, to ensure that 
inventors are required to disclose precisely how their invention works before 
filing a patent application.48 One area of particular concern to Lemley is the 
abuse of functional claiming, especially by the owners of patents on computer 
software.49 Functional claiming essentially allows software patentees to claim 
to own the function of their program, not merely the particular way their 
program performs that function.50 If those functional patent claims were 
limited to the solutions actually described in the patent’s specification, Lemley 
argues, inventors would have a greater incentive to build and test before 
running to the patent office.51 By contrast, when functional claims are not 
limited to the specific solutions disclosed, the incentive is to file a patent 
application as early as possible so that the inventor can secure priority, safe in 
the knowledge that the patent’s scope can, in later infringement litigation, be 
expanded as necessary to cover the allegedly infringing technology. 
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit in 2015 issued an en banc decision that, 
consistent with Lemley’s recommendation, appears to restrict the ability of 
 
47 Cf. Cotropia, supra note 14, at 95-96 (discussing how early filing impedes production 
of technical information about the invention and of information about any potential market 
for the invention). 
48 Although Lemley situates his argument for curtailing broad claim scope within the 
disclosure doctrines of § 112 of the Patent Act, other doctrines could also be used to control 
claim scope. For example, if inventions were required to be not only “practically” useful (as 
is the case under current case law applying the utility requirement of § 101) but also 
“commercially” useful, broad claims reciting inventions for which there is no market or that 
cannot be produced in a cost-effective manner might be found to be unpatentable. See 
Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1200, 1240-41; see also 
Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 103 (2011) 
( “Patent specifications that represent significant leaps in usefulness . . . should be entitled to 
broader claims.”). And, of course, claim scope can always be altered in litigation at the 
claim construction and infringement stages. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 24, at 
852-68. I do not read Lemley’s focus on § 112 to exclude these possible alternatives.  
49 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1192. 
50 Lemley, supra note 5, at 907. 
51 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1192-93. 
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patentees to obtain broad claim scope through functional claiming.52 The next 
part of this essay reviews the Federal Circuit’s decision and takes an initial 
look at district court decisions applying it in order to see if it has brought us 
any closer to solving the problems of patent scope that Lemley identifies in his 
article. 
II.  WILLIAMSON AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
Section 112(f) of the Patent Act permits patent claims to be written in what 
is called means-plus-function format, stating that a claim element “may be 
expressed as a means . . . for performing a specified function without the 
recital of structure.”53 If an element is written in means-plus-function format, 
§ 112(f) requires the claim to be construed to cover only the corresponding 
structure disclosed in the patent’s specification and the equivalents of that 
structure.54 If an element is determined not to be drafted in means-plus-
function format, § 112(f) does not apply and the claim’s scope is not 
necessarily limited to the structures disclosed in the specification. Finally, if an 
element is written in means-plus-function format but the specification does not 
disclose structure for performing the claimed function, the patent claim 
containing that element is invalid as indefinite.55 
Thus, determining whether a claim limitation has, in fact, been drafted in 
means-plus-function format is critical to determining both the claim’s scope 
and its validity.56 A key factor in making that threshold determination is 
 
52 Lemley himself wrote an amicus brief urging the court to rehear the case en banc. See 
Corrected Brief Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Professors in Support of En Banc 
Review, Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 2013-
1130), 2014 WL 7405154. 
53 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012). Before the America Invents Act, the subsections of § 112 
were contained in a series of separate paragraphs, and the discussion of means-plus-function 
claiming was found in paragraph 6. For consistency, I refer to the relevant subsection as 
§ 112(f), even though many of the cases discussed, because they involve patents filed before 
the America Invents Act, involve substantively identical § 112 ¶ 6. 
54 Id. 
55 See Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc. 675 F.3d 1302, 1311-12 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
56 In a separate contribution to this Symposium, John Duffy argues that this inquiry into 
whether a limitation has been drafted in means-plus-function format is necessary only 
because of the Federal Circuit’s misguided approach to claim construction. John F. Duffy, 
Counterproductive Notice and Literalistic Versus Peripheral Claiming, 96 B.U. L. REV. 
1197, 1209 (2016). Duffy asserts that the Federal Circuit, in allowing the literal language of 
the claims to define the patent’s scope, has ignored older case law suggesting that a patent’s 
scope should be limited to the embodiments disclosed in the specification and their 
equivalents. Id. at 1207. Drawing on this older case law, Duffy argues that the admonition in 
§ 112(f)—that claims containing means-plus-function elements should be construed to cover 
only the structures disclosed in the specification—does nothing more than confirm that 
those claims should be governed by the same interpretative rule that governs all patent 
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whether the claim contains the word “means.” If it does, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that the claim is a means-plus-function claim subject to § 112(f).57 
Conversely, if the claim does not contain the word “means,” there is a 
rebuttable presumption that § 112(f) does not apply.58 
Beginning about ten years ago, the Federal Circuit strengthened the 
presumption that § 112(f) does not apply if a claim does not include the word 
“means,” characterizing the presumption as “strong” and “not readily 
overcome.”59 Consequently, patent applicants, particularly in the software 
industry, began to draft and obtain claims that were functional and lacked 
structure, but that avoided the requirements of § 112(f) by omitting the term 
“means.”60 For instance, rather than describing a software invention as a 
“means for” performing some function, applicants drafted claims that used so-
called nonce terms such as “system for” or “mechanism for” performing that 
function.61 Or they claimed a computer “capable of” or “configured to” 
perform a particular function.62 The advantage of this tactic to a patentee is 
breadth: a claim that is not subject to § 112(f) will not be limited to the 
structures recited in the specification and will not be found to be invalid simply 
because the specification does not disclose a structure, such as a specific 
algorithm, to perform the claimed function.63 
 
claims, to wit, that the claims’ scope should be limited to the embodiments disclosed. Id. at 
1210.      
57 Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 703-04 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
58 Id. 
59 E.g., Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
60 Lemley, supra note 5, at 926-28. 
61 See id. at 923. In patent argot, nonce terms are “substitutes for the word ‘means’ that 
facially suggest structure but, in fact, merely describe function.” David J. Kappos & 
Christopher P. Davis, Functional Claiming and the Patent Balance, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
365, 367 (2015). In more general usage, a nonce term is a word created for a particular 
purpose. See Nonce, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2003). Examples include quark 
(for the subatomic particle), grok (to understand), and, personal favorites of mine, embiggen 
and cromulent, see The Simpsons: Lisa the Iconoclast (Fox television broadcast Feb. 18, 
1996), as in “a noble spirit embiggens the smallest man” and “embiggen is a perfectly 
cromulent word.” See generally Nonce Words, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Nonce_word [https://perma.cc/KSY2-EV9S]. 
62 See Lemley, supra note 5, at 926. 
63 For evidence of patentees’ increasing use of nonce terms, see Dennis Crouch, 
Functional Claim Language in Issued Patents, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 23, 2014), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/01/functional-language-patents.html [https://perma.cc/ 
9TVM-ALAP]. According to Crouch’s data, until about 1996, over 50% of patents included 
an independent claim containing the phrase “means for.” Id. Today, that number is less than 
10%. Id. Instead, nearly 50% of patents include a claim containing the phrase “for . . .ing” 
(such as “for calculating”) without using the term “means,” up from about 30% in the mid-
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The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Williamson restricts the ability of 
patent applicants to avoid the strictures of § 112(f) by simply omitting the term 
“means.” In the Williamson case, the Federal Circuit overruled the “strong” 
presumption that a limitation lacking the word “means” is not subject to 
§ 112(f).64 Although the presumption remains, the court emphasized that the 
key inquiry is “whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of 
ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for 
structure.”65 If the claim contains no structure, § 112(f) applies and the claim’s 
scope will be limited to the structures in the specification. 
The facts of Williamson illustrate how the § 112(f) analysis now works. The 
patent-in-suit described methods and systems for “distributed learning,” which 
essentially amounted to using standard computers linked by a network to create 
a virtual classroom that connected a presenter to geographically remote 
audience members.66 The claim limitation at issue recited a “distributed 
learning control module for receiving communications transmitted between the 
presenter and the audience member computer systems and for relaying the 
communications to an intended receiving computer system and for 
coordinating the operation of [a] streaming data module.”67 
The district court treated the claim limitation as a means-plus-function 
limitation subject to § 112(f), but a panel of the Federal Circuit reversed, 
emphasizing that the district court “failed to give weight to the strong 
presumption that [§ 112(f)] did not apply based on the absence of the word 
‘means.’”68 On rehearing, the en banc Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court in relevant part, ruling that the “distributed learning control module” 
limitation was subject to § 112(f).69 The Federal Circuit emphasized that the 
claim was written in a format consistent with traditional means-plus-function 
claims, reciting a “module for [performing a function].”70 The court also 
observed that the claim simply replaced the term “means” with “module”—“a 
well-known nonce word.”71 The court then turned to the question of 
indefiniteness. The patent’s specification, according to the court, made clear 
that the claimed function must be performed on “a general purpose computer 
programmed to perform particular functions.”72 In that circumstance, the 
 
1990s. Id. And nearly 30% of patents now contain the phrase “configured to,” up from less 
than 5% in the mid-1990s. Id. 
64 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in 
relevant part). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1343. 
67 Id. at 1344. 
68 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 770 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
69 Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1354. 
70 Id. at 1350-51. 
71 Id. at 1350. 
72 Id. at 1352. 
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specification must disclose an algorithm (that is, a sequence of steps or 
operations73) for performing the claimed function.74 Because the specification 
did not disclose an algorithm, the court held the patent claim to be invalid for 
indefiniteness.75 
Williamson should make it easier for accused infringers to show that 
limitations that include nonce words such as “module” or “system” are subject 
to § 112(f), meaning that they will be construed to cover only the structures 
disclosed in the specification. Narrower claim constructions make it easier to 
show noninfringement, and a broader applicability of § 112(f) offers expanded 
opportunities to argue that a patent is invalid for failing to disclose structure to 
perform a claimed function. Williamson thus pushes the law in the direction 
sought by Lemley in Ready for Patenting: by subjecting a greater number of 
patents to the requirement that they disclose structure, patent applicants will be 
forced to build and test their invention so they can disclose that structure. 
Moreover, as Lemley notes, a patentee who, in an effort to disclose the 
required structure, provides only “prophetic examples” about how an invention 
might work will be limited to those prophetic examples and forbidden from 
claiming different, later-developed solutions that actually work.76 
Whether the changes made by Williamson to the law of claim construction 
are significant will be determined in large part by the federal district courts, 
which confront claim construction issues more frequently and in greater 
numbers than the Federal Circuit. Although this essay is not the place for a 
comprehensive analysis of Williamson’s effects, several recent district court 
cases are particularly noteworthy because the court in each case twice 
considered whether § 112(f) applied to particular claim limitations—once 
before Williamson and again after Williamson. Accordingly, those cases 
provide useful clues about the likely consequences of the Federal Circuit’s 
decision. 
One consequence, as the facts of Williamson suggest, is that functional 
claims that are particularly broad and vague will either be limited in scope or 
invalidated. The Central District of California’s decision in Farstone 
Technology, Inc. v. Apple Inc.77 illustrates this point. In that case, Farstone, the 
patentee, alleged that the Time Machine features of Apple’s computers 
infringed its patent, which involved technology that created a backup of data 
 
73 Allen Newell, Response: The Models Are Broken, the Models Are Broken, 47 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1986). 
74 Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352 (citing Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 
1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); see also Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 
800 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The algorithm may be expressed as a mathematical 
formula, in prose, as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient 
structure.”). 
75 Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1354. 
76 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1193. 
77 No. 8:13-CV-1537, 2015 WL 5898273 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015). 
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stored on a hard disk and enabled a user to later restore that data.78 The key 
claim limitation recited “a processing system having at least one hardware 
resource with a backup/recovery module, said backup/recovery module 
creating at least one recovery unit to hold backup data.”79 In a claim 
construction order issued before Williamson, the court rejected Apple’s 
argument that the “processing system” limitation should be construed as a 
means-plus-function limitation.80 The court noted the “strong presumption” 
against means-plus-function claim construction when the term “means” is not 
used and found that Apple had not rebutted that presumption.81 The court 
reasoned that the claim referenced the “processing system” in structural terms, 
as a portion of computer equipment with a hardware resource that included a 
backup/recovery module.82 
After Williamson, the court supplemented its prior claim construction order 
and invalidated the claim as indefinite because “backup/recovery module” was 
a means-plus-function element unsupported by structure.83 Analogizing to 
Williamson, the court noted that “module” is a “well-known nonce word” that 
substitutes for “means” and that the claim was drafted in a format consistent 
with traditional means-plus-function limitations.84 The court also noted that the 
claim did not impart any structural significance to the backup/recovery 
module.85 It did not, for instance, “describe how the ‘backup/recovery module’ 
creates a recovery unit to hold backup data.”86 On the issue of validity, the 
court, again like the en banc Federal Circuit in Williamson, observed that the 
specification provided no algorithm for the function of creating a recovery unit 
and thus held the claim to be invalid as indefinite.87 
Farstone illustrates how courts can now subject many software patents to 
the requirements of § 112(f)—and thereby narrow or invalidate them—by 
simply analogizing to Williamson. Yet other recent decisions make clear that, 
even after Williamson, not all limitations that contain nonce words and 
functional language will be deemed to be means-plus-function limitations 
subject to § 112(f). The decisions also show future patent applicants how to 
draft around Williamson by simply including structural details in the patent 
 
78 Id. at *1. 
79 Id. 
80 Farstone Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 8:13-CV-1537, 2015 WL 857706 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 27, 2015). 
81 Id. at *11. 
82 Id. at *12. 
83 Farstone Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 8:13-CV-1537, 2015 WL 5898273, at *3 (C.D. 




87 Id. at *5. 
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claim itself, even if those details add little substance and therefore keep the 
scope of the claim quite broad. 
In M2M Solutions LLC v. Sierra Wireless America, Inc.,88 for example, the 
District of Delaware ruled that a limitation containing the nonce term 
“module”—the same term at issue in Williamson and Farstone—was not a 
means-plus-function limitation, meaning that the patent would not be 
invalidated for failing to disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed 
function.89 The patent in that case related to wireless communication networks. 
The relevant claim limitation recited, in the convoluted fashion familiar to 
patent lawyers: 
a processing module for authenticating an at least one transmission sent 
from a programming transmitter and received by [a] programmable 
communicator device, the at least one transmission including a coded 
number and at least one telephone number or Internet Protocol (IP) 
address corresponding to an at least one monitoring device, where the 
processing module authenticates the at least one transmission by 
determining if the at least one transmission contains the coded number, 
the processing module authenticating the at least one transmission if the 
transmission includes the coded number.90 
Before the Federal Circuit decided Williamson, the district court in M2M 
rejected the accused infringers’ argument that “processing module” was a 
means-plus-function limitation, relying in part on decisions by other district 
courts that “module” connotes sufficient structure to avoid the application of   
§ 112(f).91 
After Williamson, the accused infringers argued that the court should 
reconsider its earlier ruling because, as in Williamson and Farstone, the claim 
simply used “module” as a substitute for “means.”92 The court conceded that 
“it is probably the case that the word ‘processing’ by itself fails to provide 
sufficient structure in the term ‘processing module.’”93 However, in 
reaffirming its earlier conclusion that § 112(f) did not apply, the court relied on 
a declaration by the patentee’s expert stating that the claim language 
surrounding the term “processing module” explains how the authenticating 
function is to be performed.94 According to that declaration, the claim 
disclosed a “simple three step algorithm”: “(1) identifying a coded number 
contained in a received incoming transmission; (2) retrieving a coded number 
stored locally in memory on the receiving device; and (3) comparing the coded 
 
88 No. CV 12-30, 2015 WL 5826816 (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2015). 
89 Id. at *5. 
90 Id. at *4. 
91 Id. at *3. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at *4. 
94 See id. 
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number from the transmission with the coded number retrieved from memory 
to determine whether they match.”95 
M2M illustrates how future patent applicants can try to draft around 
Williamson by merely including some details in the claim itself about how the 
function is performed, even if the structure disclosed is, as the patentee’s own 
expert stated in M2M, “simple.” That simple algorithm—which consists of 
using coded numbers to identify devices on a particular network—could 
conceivably be infringed by a wide array of wireless communication systems. 
In another district court decision reconsidering a claim construction order 
after Williamson, Collaborative Agreements, LLC v. Adobe Systems Inc.,96 the 
Northern District of California, like the court in M2M, found claim language to 
provide sufficient structure to avoid the application of § 112(f), even though 
the structure disclosed was very straightforward, consisting primarily of 
conventional computer hardware.97 The patent-in-suit described a computer 
program that allows sellers of intellectual property to disclose information to 
potential buyers while also maintaining control over the information.98 The 
claim limitation at issue recited a “code segment” for performing various 
functions including “receiving . . . electronic documents and an identity 
validation at a server” from one party’s computer, receiving at the server an 
identity validation from the counterparty’s computer, and “posting the received 
electronic documents” on the server so that the counterparty can view them.99 
Similar to the court in M2M, the court in Collaborative Agreements 
emphasized that the claim language did “not simply describe broadly phrased 
high-level functions.”100 Instead, the claim “describe[d] the objective and 
operation of the code segment . . . while also describing the structural 
interactions among the computer program’s code segment components.”101 
Distinguishing Williamson, the court noted simply that “the claim language 
describes the code segment’s operation with a degree of specificity not 
present” in that case.102 
Finally, in Magna Electronics, Inc. v. TRW Automotive Holdings Corp.,103 
the Western District of Michigan, on a post-Williamson motion for 
reconsideration, rejected the argument that a vehicular “crash avoidance 
system” was a means-plus-function limitation.104 The court emphasized that 
the claim recited structure, including a camera that included a lens and an 
 
95 Id. at *4 n.4. 
96 No. 15-CV-3853, 2015 WL 7753293 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2015). 
97 Id. at *9. 
98 See id. at *1-2. 
99 Id. at *2. 
100 Id. at *5. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at *6.   
103 No. 1:12-CV-654 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2016), ECF No. 674. 
104 Id., slip op. at 11. 
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imager, a mounting element, a mechanism for mounting the system to the 
windshield, and a module including a housing for the camera.105 Although the 
court found those elements to provide sufficient structure to avoid § 112(f), 
they are quite generic, consisting mainly of a camera inside of a housing 
mounted to a car’s windshield. The patent in Magna Electronics could, 
therefore, encompass a broad range of automobile safety systems. 
Williamson, to be sure, closed a drafting loophole. Section 112(f), recall, 
limits means-plus-function limitations to the specific structures disclosed in the 
patent’s specification. And if the specification discloses no structure for 
performing the function claimed in a means-plus-function limitation, the patent 
claim is invalid. After Williamson, a patentee can no longer avoid those 
narrowing (or invalidating) doctrines by simply omitting the term “means” 
from its claims. Yet, as illustrated by M2M, Collaborative Agreements, and 
Magna Electronics, patent claims that provide some detail about how a 
claimed function is performed will still avoid application of § 112(f), even if 
the implementing structure is relatively “simple,” as in M2M, consists 
primarily of conventional computer hardware, as in Collaborative Agreements, 
or is highly generic, like the camera, housing, and mounting element in Magna 
Electronics.106 
Of course, other factors may contribute to courts’ reluctance to reconsider 
their prior claim constructions. Some courts apply a high bar for reconsidering 
prior orders, even if there has been a change in the law.107 There are probably 
anchoring effects, too. Not only are judges likely predisposed to adhere to prior 
decisions, intervening events—such as a trial—can make the costs of 
reconsideration unacceptably high.108 
 
105 Id. 
106 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, I have located one other decision in 
which a district court denied a post-Williamson motion for reconsideration. The research in 
this essay is current through January 2016. In Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 6:13-CV-
447, 2015 WL 4208754 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2015), the court ruled, in a case involving patents 
on data storage and access systems, that claim limitations containing the terms “processor” 
and “code” were not means-plus-function limitations. Id. at *3. The court noted that that the 
accused infringer’s own experts had opined that those terms, on their own, connoted 
structure to persons of ordinary skill in the art and that, in any case, the claims “include[d] 
substantial additional language describing the operation of the components at issue and their 
interaction with other components.” Id. (footnote omitted). Because of the court’s estoppel-
like reasoning, the case does not seem particularly significant to an analysis of Williamson’s 
likely effects.  
107 See, e.g., Magna Elecs., No. 1:12-CV-654, slip op. at 1-2 (stating that “the party 
moving for reconsideration bears a ‘heavy’ burden to . . . ‘show that a different disposition 
of the case must result’” from the change in governing law (quoting W.D. MICH. CIV. R. 
7.4(a))). 
108 For instance, at the time of the motion for reconsideration in Smartflash, see supra 
note 106, a jury had already found that the patents were infringed and not invalid. See 
  
1240 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:1223 
 
Or the decisions in M2M, Collaborative Agreements, and Magna 
Electronics might simply be wrong.109 At a minimum, the cases illustrate the 
wide discretion courts now have in deciding whether to apply § 112(f). Before 
Williamson, Federal Circuit law provided a relatively bright-line rule: if a 
claim did not contain the word “means,” § 112(f) was almost always irrelevant. 
Now, the law is more standard-like, giving courts more leeway in deciding 
whether to treat a limitation as a means-plus-function limitation. Although 
Williamson offers courts a clear path for applying § 112(f) to many functional 
claims, M2M, Collaborative Agreements, and Magna Electronics illustrate 
how most patent claims will contain at least some structure that a court can 
invoke to justify a conclusion that § 112(f) should not apply. Ultimately, it may 
be up to the Federal Circuit, which generally reviews de novo the issue of 
whether § 112(f) applies,110 to ensure consistency in the law. But the discretion 
provided by Williamson could facilitate inconsistency among different panels 
of the Federal Circuit—a phenomenon that already exists in other aspects of 
Federal Circuit claim construction law.111 
The decisions that refuse to apply § 112(f) also provide a roadmap for future 
patent applicants to draft around Williamson. For instance, the patentee in 
Williamson would have had a strong argument against applying § 112(f) if the 
claim had succinctly explained how the distributed learning control module 
worked, such as by receiving data at a server computer via a network from an 
audience member’s computer and relaying the data via the network from the 
server computer to the presenter’s computer.112 Those additional limitations, 
one might argue, provide a simple, two-step algorithm that, like the algorithm 
supposedly disclosed by the patent in M2M, provides structure (consisting 
 
Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 6:13-CV-447, 2015 WL 4093132 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 
2015). 
109 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1192-93 n.116. 
110 See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing 
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 840-41 (2015)).  
111 See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2004). 
112 See Michael Risch, The Past and Future of Functional Claiming, WRITTEN 
DESCRIPTION (June 16, 2015), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2015/06/the-past-and-
future-of-functional.html [https://perma.cc/6FGV-JLLK] (observing that, in Williamson, the 
patentee identified in the specification “figures that showed the input fields and the selection 
of the intended computer systems” and suggesting that the patentee could have avoided 
application of § 112(f) by adding to the claim “a paragraph that said: ‘get data from 
audience client software and send data to a computer programmed to receive and process 
such data (and located at the address selected from the list)’”). For a similar effort at 
redrafting the claim from Williamson to avoid § 112(f), see Michael D. Stein, How 
Structural Claim Limitations Can Save Software Patents, LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2016), 
http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/751757/how-structural-claim-limitations-can-save-
software-patents [https://perma.cc/69Y5-ATCG] (conceding that one “could argue that the 
limitations added to the claim are generic limitations inherent in any modern computer”). 
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mainly of conventional computer hardware, as in Collaborative Agreements) 
and avoids application of § 112(f).113 To make the argument against applying 
§ 112(f) even stronger, the applicant could easily add information about how 
the server computer processes the data and coordinates the operation of the 
entire system for conducting distributed learning, although that type of 
information would begin to narrow the scope of the claim. 
Because Williamson could prove easy to draft around, other doctrines—
particularly the patentable subject matter requirement of § 101 of the Patent 
Act—will remain important to curtailing overly broad patents. Since 2010, the 
Supreme Court has applied the patentable subject matter requirement with 
increased rigor, forbidding patents from covering “abstract ideas” merely 
because those ideas are implemented on a computer. In Alice Corp. v. CLS 
Bank International,114 for example, the Court invalidated patents on methods 
and computer systems for ensuring that a party to a transaction will make 
payment.115 And in Bilski v. Kappos116 the Court held unpatentable methods of 
hedging financial risk that almost certainly would have been performed on a 
computer.117 Thus, many computer-related patents, even if they are not subject 
to § 112(f) under Williamson, remain vulnerable to § 101 validity challenges. 
In this vein, one could argue that the patent in Collaborative Agreements, 
although not narrowed or invalidated under § 112(f), is invalid under § 101 
because, like the patents in Alice, it claims nothing more than the use of a 
computer to solve a long-recognized problem: the risk that a party to a 
transaction might later disclose sensitive information learned during 
negotiations.118 Moreover, the patent in M2M, which claims a module that 
 
113 For criticism of decisions that have found generic computer hardware and algorithmic 
descriptions of function to be sufficient structure to avoid § 112(f), see Kevin Emerson 
Collins, The Williamson Revolution in Software’s Structure, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 47, 54-55) (on file with author) (arguing that, after 
Williamson, the Federal Circuit should either treat all software patents as lacking structure 
and therefore subject to § 112(f) or articulate a new, stand-alone definition of structure to be 
used in construing software patents).  
114 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
115 Id. at 2358. 
116 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
117 Id. at 611-12. 
118 This problem embodies economist Kenneth Arrow’s famous information paradox: 
one party has information to sell that is valuable only because it is secret, but no buyer 
would purchase the information without a chance to inspect it. See Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NAT’L BUREAU OF 
ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECON. AND SOCIAL 
FACTORS 609, 615 (1962). To my knowledge, § 101 issues have not been litigated in 
Collaborative Agreements, although the accused infringer raised § 101 as a defense in its 
answer. See Defendant’s Answer to Second Amended Complaint at 6, Collaborative 
Agreements, LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc., No. 15-CV-3853 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2014), ECF No. 
55. 
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identifies, retrieves, and compares two numbers, resembles yet another patent 
recently invalidated by the Supreme Court on § 101 grounds, which claimed 
the steps of administering a drug to a patient, determining metabolite levels in 
the bloodstream, and comparing those levels to ranges disclosed in the 
patent.119 One could also argue that the patent in Magna Electronics fails § 101 
because, like the patents in Alice and other pathmarking § 101 decisions, it 
claims an abstract idea (avoiding car crashes) implemented through 
conventional technology (a windshield mounted camera).120 And, as this essay 
was going to press, the district court in Williamson (on remand from the 
Federal Circuit) invalidated several other claims of the patent in that case for 
failing to satisfy § 101.121 The invalidated claims included a claim to a 
“method of conducting distributed learning” and a functional claim to a 
“distributed learning server” that apparently disclosed enough structure to 
avoid § 112(f).122 The court reasoned that the claims were directed to the 
abstract idea of creating a virtual, interactive learning environment and that the 
abstract idea was not patent eligible because it was implemented on industry-
standard computer hardware and software.123 
Interestingly, Lemley, in his prior writing on functional claiming, foresaw 
precisely this interplay between means-plus-function claiming and § 101. Two 
years before the Federal Circuit decided Williamson, he suggested that 
functional claims that are not treated as means-plus-function claims subject to 
§ 112(f) (and hence are not limited to the specific examples described in the 
specification) will likely be invalid under § 101 because they are too abstract. 
Accordingly, Lemley noted that restricting functional claiming would have the 
unexpected effect of saving many software patents from invalidation.124 
 
119 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297-98 
(2012). Mayo, it should be noted, involved a patent on the diagnostic method itself, whereas 
M2M involves a patent on an apparatus that performs a particular function, so the analogy is 
not perfect. See M2M Solutions LLC v. Sierra Wireless Am., Inc., No. CV 12-30, slip op. at 
32 (D. Del. Jan. 6, 2016), ECF No. 247 (denying the accused infringer’s motion for 
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Having surveyed the post-Williamson case law, it seems likely that Lemley’s 
predictions will prove correct. 
CONCLUSION 
Ready for Patenting offers a lucid explanation of a critical, notice-related 
problem in patent law and clear and realistic prescriptions to help solve it. The 
Federal Circuit in Williamson embraced one of Lemley’s recommendations by 
curtailing the abuse of functional claiming. Under Williamson, means-plus-
function patentees will not be able to file early and obtain broad claim scope in 
later litigation. Although patent applicants may be able to draft around 
Williamson by providing generic structure that avoids application of § 112(f), 
the decision—coupled with an invigorated requirement of patentable subject 
matter under § 101—represents at least a small step toward ensuring that 
patent law protects inventors who do the difficult work of building prototypes 
and testing their ideas. 
 
